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Abstract—Exposing the rate information of wireless transmis-
sion enables highly efficient attacks that can severely degrade
the performance of a network at very low cost. In this paper,
we introduce an integrated solution to conceal the rate infor-
mation of wireless transmissions while simultaneously boosting
the resiliency against interference. The proposed solution is
based on a generalization of Trellis Coded Modulation combined
with Cryptographic Interleaving. We develop algorithms for
discovering explicit codes for concealing any modulation in
BPSK, QPSK, 8-PSK, 16-QAM, 64-QAM. We demonstrate that
in most cases this modulation hiding scheme has the side effect
of boosting resiliency by up to 8.5dB.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication is the key enabling technology
of the Mobile Revolution that we are currently enjoying.
Beyond enabling Mobile Phones, Wireless Sensor Networks,
and the Internet of Things devices, it is also key to Cyber-
Physical Systems such as SCADA Wireless Remote Terminal
Units. In general, the convenience of wireless communication
is making it the primary technology for connecting to the
Internet. Manufacturers of laptops and streaming devices, such
as the Apple MacBook Pro and the Roku streaming player, are
even removing Ethernet ports and entirely relying on wireless.
However, the broadcast nature of the wireless medium makes
it vulnerable to two types of major attacks denial of service,
and information leakage. In this paper, we are interested in
the impact of exposing the rate information (modulation and
coding) on enabling such attacks. In related work [1], Noubir
et al. showed that knowledge of the rate used in a transmission
enables selective jamming of packets resulting in very efficient
attacks on all the Wi-Fi rate adaptation protocols they in-
vestigated. They analytically and experimentally demonstrated
that smart rate-aware jamming can degrade and maintain the
performance of a communication link at its lowest rate, while
simultaneously blocking other links communications. They
showed that when a link is degraded from 54 Mbps to 1 Mbps,
it blocks other devices but also results in higher collisions
provoking a long-lasting network-wide congestion collapse.
One of the key reasons why such attacks are possible is
because the rate information is either explicit (e.g., PSF field
of the IEEE 802.11 PLCP header) or implicit (analysis of I/Q
modulation).
Designing countermeasures to wireless DoS attacks before
they become widespread is very important for both military
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Fig. 1: Comparison of bit error rates of uncoded modulations.
and commercial applications as Jamming represents a real
and serious threat. A highly mediatized incident in March
2012 [2], resulted in the FCC releasing an urgent customer
advisory cautioning against the import and use of jamming
devices [3]. Since then, the FCC has stepped up its education
and enforcement effort [4] and rolled out a new jammer tip
line (1-855-55NOJAM) [5], and issued several fines [6].
Jamming at the physical layer has been extensively studied
(cf. [7] for a recent monograph on this subject). Reliable com-
munication in the presence of adversaries regained significant
interest in the last few years, as new jamming attacks as well as
need for more complex applications and deployment environ-
ments have emerged (cf. [8, 9] and references therein). Specif-
ically crafted attacks and counter-measures have been studied
for packetized wireless data networks [10–12], multiple access
resolution [13–15], multi-hop networks [11, 16, 17], MIMO
systems [18], and wireless sensor networks [16, 19, 20],
spread-spectrum without shared secrets [21–23].
However, limited work has been done on strengthening
rate adaptation algorithms [24–26]. An unresolved challenge
remained to prevent an adversary from guessing the rate
(Modulation, Coding information) during the transmission
and therefore from selectively interfering with packet. More
recently, Rahbari and Krunz proposed a modulation level
encryption to hide the rate of communications [27]. While this
scheme conceals the rate information, it does so at the cost of
degrading the robustness of the communication by 1-2dB.
In this paper, we introduce an integrated solution – Conceal
and Boost Modulation (CBM) – to conceal the rate information
of wireless transmissions while simultaneously boosting the
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communication resiliency against interference. The adversary
sees all communications using the highest order modulation.
The proposed solution is based on a generalization of Trellis
Coded Modulation combined with Cryptographic Interleaving.
We developed novel algorithms for efficiently discovering
and validating new trellis codes capable of upgrading any
modulation constellation to any higher order constellation. We
devise explicit codes for concealing any modulation in BPSK,
QPSK, 8-PSK, 16-QAM, 64-QAM. We demonstrate that in
most cases this modulation hiding scheme has the side effect
of boosting resiliency by up to 8.5dB and over 9.5 dB in
comparison with prior work [27].
A side effect of the proposed mechanisms is that they also
help mitigating passive attacks against users traffic analysis
and fingerprinting [28].
II. CHALLENGES TO CONCEALING RATE INFORMATION
We present the model for the wireless system studied in
this work, then discuss the threats and challenges to the
communications due to exposing the rate information.
A. Model
Adversary: The adversary is assumed to be located
within the wireless communication range of the legitimate
transmitters and receivers. Besides, the adversary can carry
some signal processing on the received signal to fingerprint
and extract rate information. The adversary can also generate
power-limited interference to disrupt the communication.
Transmitter and receiver: The communication between
the transmitter and receiver is carried hardware/software im-
plementing a public standard, i.e., transmitted and received
on some specific channels at regulated power levels. This
assumption implies that the transmission can be detected,
analyzed and jammed by the adversary.
System robustness: Wireless communications are typi-
cally made robust through the use of multiple Modulation-
Coding Schemes (MCS) combined with a rate adaptation
algorithm that select the rate as a function of link quality.
B. Challenges
Knowing the rate being used by the communication can lead
to a very efficient attack for the adversary, because most of
wireless systems can only operate reliably at a bit error rate of
10−6 or below. For instance, a TCP packet of typical size 1440
bytes can only be transmitted at a success probability of 99%
if the bit error rate of the channel is under 10−6. At the bit
error rate 10−6, a communication using 64-QAM modulation
requires the transmitter to transmit at a power 18dB higher
than the noise level (as shown in Fig. 1). This implies that an
adversary only needs to use a jamming power of about 18dB
(60 times) lower than the transmitter’s power to make the com-
munication unreliable. In contrast, a BPSK communication
requires a stronger adversary to achieve the same jamming
impact. Smart adversaries have been built to efficiently jam
the wireless link based on the knowledge of the transmission
rate (see [1] for an example of adaptive jamming in IEEE
(a) 8-PSK (b) 16-QAM
Fig. 2: Adversary can record the signal and guess the modulation
based on the constellation pattern.
802.11 networks). Therefore, concealing the rate information
is crucial for the robustness of practical wireless systems, and
is the focus of this work. In the following paragraphs, we
show that without specific techniques by design, an adversary
can easily indentify the rate information and launch efficient
attacks. Note that straightforward solutions do not work, e.g.,
encryption cannot be done before the channel coding, and
straightforward modulation upgrade with coding compensation
is not efficient (more discussion in Section III).
a) Explicit rate information: In many communication
protocols, the rate information of a transmission is unpro-
tected. For instance in IEEE 802.11 networks, the rate is
explicitly specified in the PLCP Signaling Field (PSF) of the
physical layer’s frames. Similarly in LTE cellular systems, the
transmission rate is specified in the Modulation and Coding
Scheme (MCS) field within the Downlink Control Information
(DCI), which is itself encoded using a publicly known fixed
rate 1/3 convolutional code and QPSK modulation. An adver-
sary can easily synchronize with the communication between
two parties, analyze the data frames and extract the rate. This
attack is very practical as demonstrated by [1].
b) Constellation-based guessing: Even if the rate infor-
mation is not explicitly provided within the packet header, the
adversary can analyze the received signal in complex I/Q form.
After performing the carrier synchronization, frequency and
phase offset correction, the adversary can trace the received
constellation pattern and determine the modulation and coding
scheme in use (Fig. 2). Since most communication standards
specify a limited set of modulations and codes, the rate
information can be efficiently guessed by trial and error. This
method does not require the knowledge of the protocol’s frame
structure. A practical rate-aware jammer can easily be built on
a software-defined radio (e.g., USRP [29]) by processing the
received samples of the transmitted signal, obtaining the rate,
and jamming in real time [1, 12]. Based on the sophistication
of guessing, we classify the method into two subcategories:
modulation guessing and code guessing, in which the latter
requires more complex techniques.
III. APPROACH
In this section, we discuss the main ideas and mechanisms
of our integrated solution that can not only hide the rate
information, but also increase the robustness of the communi-
cation against interference. Our scheme – Conceal and Boost
Modulation (CBM) – is depicted in Fig. 3. The General Trellis
Encoder Encryptor
DecryptorDecoder
noisy
malicious
channel
GTCM Crypto.Interleaving
TX Radio
RX Radio
0100..
0100..
Fig. 3: Our CBM system comprises General Trellis Coded Modula-
tion and Cryptographic Interleaving modules.
Coded Modulation (GTCM) module’s functionalities are two-
fold. First, it makes the constellation pattern indistinguishable
to the adversary, therewith countering the constellation-based
modulation-guessing. Second, it boosts the system resiliency
against interference. The Cryptographic Interleaving (CI) mod-
ule conceals the rate information from explicit exposing and
implicit constellation-based code-guessing.
Our idea for hiding the constellation is to always use a single
unifying modulation (the highest order) to transmit data in or-
der to create the same constellation observed by the adversary.
To preserve the robustness specified by the original modula-
tion, the GTCM module encodes the data by a suitable code of
rate matching the bit rate ratio between the original modulation
and the target modulation. To be precise, let’s consider a
system that supports a set of N different modulations ordered
by the number of bits per symbol b1 ≤ . . . ≤ bN . Assume that
the transmission is carried at a bit rate k = bK bits per symbol
for some modulation K. In order to conceal the constellation,
we transmit using the highest-order modulation N of bit rate
n = bN as the target modulation, then encode the data using an
adequate code of rate k/n and transmit the encoded data using
modulation N . For example, in a system that supports N = 4
different modulations {BPSK, QPSK, 8-PSK, 16-QAM}, any
transmission using a modulation different than 16-QAM will
be encoded and transmitted with 16-QAM modulation. Since
the adversary will always observe the same constellation, the
GTCM module hides the actual rate from constellation-based
modulation-guessing attacks. Moreover, we argue that with
coding, the robustness of the system can also be improved.
To counter the constellation-based code-guessing, we
harden the system using the CI module, which interleaves
the modulated symbols before transmission. We emphasize
that the interleaving process is performed at the baseband
samples level, i.e., complex symbols produced by the GTCM
module are interleaved per block of transmitted symbols. We
note that straightforward encryption of data before the GTCM
processing does not conceal the rate information. For example,
the adversary can try to decode the data iterating over all the
possible codes. During the decoding phase, the likelihood of
decoding each possible sequence is recorded and evaluated.
The code corresponding to the maximum likelihood will be
the one used by the transmission. The attack is based on the
fact that output sequences of different codes are not identically
distributed in the output stream. This requires that we design
an interleaving mechanism based on cryptographic functions
in order to make the interleaved symbol sequence indistin-
guishable to the adversary. We derive a specific method to
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Fig. 4: Performance comparison between (1) our TCM code with
standard 16-QAM, and (2) best traditional binary code (from [30])
of rate 2/4 with Gray coded 16-QAM.
efficiently generate interleaving functions used for permuting
the output symbols from the GTCM module in such a way that
the transmit stream does not leak the rate information. For the
receiver to be able to decode the data, the rate information is
embedded into the packet in an encrypted form such that only
the receiver, who shares the secret key with the transmitter,
can decrypt the information.
It is important to understand the implications of rate hiding.
On one hand, the highest-order modulation creates redundancy
by the constellation expansion. On the other hand, the con-
stellation points’ pair-wise distances are closer than in the
original constellation. Without good design specifically tar-
geting to the upgraded modulation’s constellation, the system
can become less resilient against interference. For example,
the modulation unification technique used in [27] results in
the system robustness 1-2dB less than regular rate-exposing
systems. The reduced resiliency is because no coding is used
in their system. However, even using good traditional binary
codes can not guarantee the robustness of the system because
they maximize the Hamming distance between codewords
and are not designed for coded modulation. An illustration is
shown in Fig. 4. We take the best code
(
17 13 05 02
10 03 17 15
)
of
rate 2/4 from Table VII in [30], and use it with Gray coded
16-QAM modulation. Comparing it with our derived TCM
code
(
01 12 16 11
01 13 16 11
)
of the same rate and constraint, we
see a gain of about 4dB is achieved with our code, while the
binary code almost gives no advantage over uncoded QPSK
at BER = 10−6. Therefore, with good codes designed for the
target modulation, we can gain instead of losing. As seen later
in Section IV, increasing the code’s constraint length can boost
the resiliency up to 8.5dB.
Searching for good codes for the rate-hiding systems must
take into account the constellation description defined by the
highest-order modulation. This idea is rooted in the Trellis
Coded Modulation (TCM) technique introduced by Unger-
boeck [31], who focused on devising modulation codes of rate
k/(k+1). In the literature, finding good TCM codes is a chal-
lenging problem, for which only heuristic solutions have been
studied such as the set partitioning rules established in [31].
Unfortunately, a full theoretical analysis is not yet known for
good TCM code construction. In this work, we introduce a
new heuristic approach for upgrading arbitrary modulations.
Our heuristic solution is not based on the conventional set
partitioning concept. Instead, we generate the code based on
the general structure of a convolutional code. Specifically, we
randomize the mapping between the inputs, shift registers, and
the outputs. Our experimental results show that this approach
can find codes at least as good as the ones found in [31]. Yet
in some cases, we obtain better codes than those in [31]. Our
work is summarized in the following main points:
• We develop a set of new algorithms that efficiently dis-
covers good modulation codes of general rate k/n. Such
codes are not restricted to be uniform as in previous work.
Such algorithms include a new technique to efficiently
compute the free distance of non-uniform codes.
• We constructed efficient codes of constraint length up to
10 used for any pair of modulations in {BPSK, QPSK,
8-PSK, 16-QAM, 64-QAM}. For the case of the rate
k/(k+1) considered by traditional TCM, we found codes
that perform better than the ones introduced in [31].
• We design a generating method that can efficiently pro-
duce fast interleaving functions used for concealing the
rate information.
• We evaluate the performance of each constructed code
demonstrating a robustness boosting up to 8.5dB and an
improvement over related rate hiding techniques of up to
10dB.
IV. GENERAL TRELLIS CODED MODULATION
In this section, we decribe the searching procedure for TCM
codes of general rate k/n, which are used to encode data
originally modulated by a modulation K of order 2k to the
highest-order modulation N of order 2n. For convenience, we
give a brief overview on TCM codes.
A TCM code is a convolutional code (k, n) defined by a
set of k shift registers storing the code’s k input bits, and
a generator matrix which specifies the input-output mapping
(e.g., Fig. 5). The longer the shift registers are, the more
redundancy the codes can have. Thus, we classify the codes
by their constraint length v defined as v =
∑k
i=1 vi, where
vi is the length of the i-th shift register. In our search
procedure, we only consider the feed-forward construction
of convolutional codes, because any construction with feed-
back can be transformed into a feedback-free construction
that produces equivalent codewords [32]. To represent a
code, we use the conventional generator polynomial form
G(D) = {gij(D), i = 0 . . . k − 1, j = 0 . . . n − 1}, where
gij(D) =
∑vi
l=0 alD
l is a univariate polynomial, and the
indeterminate D represents the delay of the input bit in the
corresponding shift register. If al = 1, the i-th input’s current
value (for l = 0) and past values (for l > 0) are mod-2
added (exclusive-or) to the j-th output. For example, the con-
volutional code (2, 4) in Fig. 5 has the generator polynomial
G =
[
D +D2 D3 D +D3 1 +D +D2
0 1 0 1 +D
]
.
Different than binary convolutional codes whose perfor-
mance depends on the Hamming distance of the binary output
x0
x1
y0
y3
y1
y2
Fig. 5: Our best TCM code of rate 2/4 (QPSK → 16-QAM) and
constraint length 4. Its boosting gain over uncoded QPSK is 3.8dB.
symbols, TCM codes’ performance is determined by the free
Euclidean distance d∞, which is the minimum Euclidean
distance of any two complex symbol sequences produced
by the code and modulation N . Since binary codes are
not designed for coded modulation, they do not take into
account the constellation mapping. The best binary code
with optimized Hamming distance can have arbitrarily small
Euclidean distance between transmitted complex symbols and
result in low performance when combined with a specific
modulation (e.g., Fig. 4). In the search for good TCM codes,
we use as comparison metrics the asymptotic coding gain
ratio measured by β = d∞N /∆K, where ∆K is the minimum
Euclidean distance between constellation points in the original
modulation K. Good TCM codes must have high β ratio.
A. Code search algorithm
We introduce a new heuristic approach for searching for
good TCM codes. The idea of the algorithm is that for a
given code specification (k, n, {vi}), the coefficients of the
generator polynomials gij are randomized between values 0
and 1. Since each coefficient change corresponds to a new code
construction, we check the generated code for the free Eu-
clidean distance. The search is performed for a fixed number of
trials independent of the code specification, thus it is extremely
faster than a full search which evaluates all possible codes.
Nevertheless, as shown in Section IV-C, our randomization
approach can achieve the same results as a full search. The
search procedure is illustrated in the RANDOMCODESEARCH
algorithm below.
RANDOMCODESEARCH(k, n, {vi},M, T )
1 d∞ = 0 // free distance of current best code
2 for i = 1 to T
3 C = generateCode(k, n, {vi})
4 if valid(C) // non-catastrophic and equiprobable
5 d = COMPUTEDISTANCE(C,M, d∞)
6 if d > d∞
7 d∞ = d // update free distance
8 C∗ = C // store new best code
9 return (C∗, d∞)
Our random search is characterized by the number of trials
T performed by RANDOMCODESEARCH. Since the code is
randomly generated, it might be (1) catastrophic, i.e., there
exists a non-zero input sequence that can produce all-zero
output sequence; and (2) non-equiprobable, i.e., the output
values are not uniformly distributed, which can help the ad-
versary distinguish the mapping we aim to conceal. Therefore,
the generated code is first validated to be non-catastrophic and
equiprobable, then its free distance d∞ is computed.
B. Free distance computing algorithm
The computational bottlneck of the code search is comput-
ing the Euclidean free distance, since it is performed for every
generated code. In the conventional TCM code construction
method based on set partitioning rules [31], computing the
free distance only involves finding the minimum distance to
the all-zero sequence. However, our random search does not
apply the set partitioning concept as we aim to search in
a higher-dimension space so that better codes can be found
(including non-uniform ones). As a result, computing free
Euclidean distance has to involve all pairs of output sequences.
Nevertheless, as shown later, we devise an efficient algorithm
– COMPUTEDISTANCE – whose running time is on average
less than 2ms on a 3GHz CPU computer for the modulations
and depths we consider.
The main idea of our COMPUTEDISTANCE’s algorithm is
based on traversing the trellis of the code and appropriately
updating the state-distances, which we define shortly below.
First, we introduce some convenient notations. Let I = {0,
. . . , 2C.k − 1} be the set of inputs, O = {0, . . . , 2C.n − 1}
the set of output symbols, and Λ = {0, . . . , 2C.v − 1} the set
of possible states corresponding to a code C. A path P of
length L is defined as a sequence of 3-tuples P = {(Si, xi,
yi), i = 0 . . . L − 1}, where Si ∈ Λ, xi ∈ I are respectively
the state and input of the code at time i, and yi ∈ O is
the output symbol due to Si and xi. The distance between
two paths P and P˜ of length L is computed by dist(P,
P˜ ) =
∑L−1
i=0 M.ed(P.y , P˜ .y), where M.ed(a, b) gives the
Euclidean distance between two points a and b on the target
coded modulationM’s constellation. Now we define the state-
distance D[S, S˜] ∆= min{dist(P, P˜ )} of two states S and S˜
as the minimum Euclidean distance between all possible paths
of the same length that end at state S and S˜, respectively.
The main idea of the algorithm is that we update D[S, S˜]
gradually when traversing the trellis with increasing L. When
two paths P and P˜ merge, i.e., P.SL-1 = S = S˜ = P˜ .SL-1 ,
the free distance d∞ is checked and updated with D[S, S˜].
COMPUTEDISTANCE(C,M, d∞best)
1 D[S, S˜] = ∞ for all (S, S˜) ∈ V 2 // state-distances
2 d∞ = ∞ // C’s free distance
3 for each S ∈ Λ, (x, x˜) ∈ I2, x 6= x˜
4 UPDATEDISTANCE(S, x, S, x˜)
5 repeat
6 for each (S, S˜) ∈ Λ2, S 6= S˜,D[S, S˜] < d∞
7 for each (x, x˜) ∈ I2
8 UPDATEDISTANCE(S, x, S˜, x˜)
9 if d∞ ≤ d∞best
10 return d∞
11 until (S, S˜) not found in line 6
12 return d∞
The algorithm COMPUTEDISTANCE starts by initializing
Fig. 6: BPSK, QPSK, 8-PSK, 16-QAM, 64-QAM constellations.
the state-distances to the distance between any path P and
P˜ starting from any same state S (line 1–4). We make the
paths diverge from the same state (line 3), then compute the
distance between them (line 4). In the main loop (line 5–
11), the state-distances are repeatedly updated for each new
segment added (line 7) to the paths until there exist no more
state pairs (S, S˜) whose state-distance D[S, S˜] is less than
d∞ (line 11). The maintenance and update of state-distances
in both the initialization and the main loop are performed by
UPDATEDISTANCE, which keeps records of D[S, S˜] for all
S, S˜. Whenever two paths P and P˜ merge at a state S, the
corresponding state-distance D[S, S] is checked to update d∞.
UPDATEDISTANCE(S, x, S˜, x˜)
1 T = C.nextState(S, x); y = C.output(S, x)
2 T˜ = C.nextState(S˜, x˜); y˜ = C.output(S˜, x˜)
3 if S = S˜
4 d = M.ed(y, y˜) // for initialization
5 else
6 d = M.ed(y, y˜) +D[S, S˜]// for main loop
7
8 if d < D[T, T˜ ]
9 D[T, T˜ ] = d
10 if d < d∞ and T = T˜ // two paths merge
11 d∞ = d
Recall the random search procedure discussed previously
where each generated code is computed for the free distance,
we speed up the search by storing the best free distance d∞best
associated to the best code C∗ discovered so far in order to
quickly eliminate the code of free distance shorter than d∞best
(line 9 in COMPUTEDISTANCE).
Correctness To prove the correctness of the algorithm, we
show that the state-distances D[S, S˜] keep records of the
distances of all possible “close” paths. The proof is based
on the following lemma.
Lemma 1. At any time i on the code trellis, for any pair of
paths P and P˜ , if there exists another pair of paths Q and Q˜
such that P.Si = Q.Si, P˜ .Si = Q˜.Si, and D[Q, Q˜] < D[P,
P˜ ], then P and P˜ can be eliminated.
Proof (sketch). By the lemma’s assumption, P merges with
Q and P˜ merges with Q˜ at time i. It is followed that at time
i+ 1, any new pair evolved from P and P˜ will find a similar
new pair evolved from Q and Q˜. Therefore, the pair (P, P˜ )
cannot have shortest distance.
Proof of correctness. At initialization of COMPUTEDISTANCE,
D[S, S˜] are set to non-infinity values only for pairs of paths
starting from the same state (line 3). This means that D[S,
S˜] properly reflect the distances of paths at initial states.
In the main loop, the algorithm traverses every transition of
the trellis and updates the state-distances. By Lemma 1, the
macro UPDATEDISTANCE will discard paths corresponding to
greater distance D[S, S˜] and keep the ones corresponding to
the shortest distance so far (line 9). Therefore, no closest pairs
are eliminated by the algorithm.
To see that the algorithm terminates, we show that there
exists a time such that D[S, S˜] ≥ d∞ for all state pairs.
It is enough to show that D[S, S˜] are increasing while d∞
is decreasing. The former is correct because evolving paths
always contain transitions that results in positive increment in
distance. The latter is due to the update in UPDATEDISTANCE.
This concludes the proof.
Computational Complexity The time complexity g(t) of
COMPUTEDISTANCE depends on the length L of the paths
where the free distance is found. We estimate g(t) in the
worst case as follows. First, the initialization of D[S, S˜]
requires 2C.v+2C.k calls to UPDATEDISTANCE. At each it-
eration of time i in the main loop, the number of updates is
at most 22C.v+2C.k. Therefore, the worst-case complexity of
COMPUTEDISTANCE is g(t) = 2C.v+2C.k + 22C.v+2C.kL =
O(22(C.v+C.k)L). In our experimental search results, we ob-
serve that the value of L can be bounded by L ≤ 3v for
any code. The running time of the algorithm on a 3GHz CPU
computer is less than 2ms.
C. Search results
In this section, we list the good codes found by our
randomization approach (Table I–V). The lists are compiled
for codes of constraint length up to v = 10 and for each
pair of original modulation K and target coded modulation
N in {BPSK, QPSK, 8-PSK, 16-QAM, 64-QAM} whose
constellations are shown in Fig. 6. We note that previous
work [31] discovered codes for only 1 bit constellation ex-
pansion. The asymptotic coding gain β is measured in dB,
and the generator matrix G is presented in the octal form
adopted from [30, 32]. The symbol mapping of m-PSK con-
stellations is p(s) = ej2pis/m, where s is transmitted symbol,
j =
√−1. For square m-QAM constellations, the mapping of
s is p(s) = (x0 + sL∆m) + j(y0 + sH∆m), where ∆m is the
minimum separation in m-QAM, (x0, y0) are coordinates of
the zero symbol (s = 0) located at the bottom-left corner of
the constellation, and sL = s mod (
√
m), sH = (s−sL)/
√
m
are corresponding to low-order and high-order bits of s. Note
that for some cases of short constraint length, there are no
good codes with positive boosting gain.
Comparison with uniform codes search As seen from
Table V for QPSK → 8-PSK, we achieve better codes than
ones in [31] for constraint lengths v = 6, 8, 10, which confirms
the intuition that better codes can be discovered if the uniform
mapping property given by the set partitioning rules is relaxed.
Comparison with full search To verify that the good codes
discovered using randomization are actually the best for each
BPSK → QPSK BPSK → 8-PSK
v β G v β G
1 1.76 (1 3) 2 3.72 (4 2 5)
2 3.98 (2 7) 3 4.77 (10 2 17)
3 4.77 (14 7) 4 5.36 (2 4 31)
4 5.44 (4 35) 5 6.02 (10 2 71)
5 6.02 (33 64) 6 6.53 (12 20 107)
6 6.99 (56 135) 7 6.99 (4 102 251)
7 6.99 (374 147) 8 7.24 (30 102 661)
8 7.78 (232 561) 9 7.63 (400 336 1715)
9 7.78 (665 1312) 10 7.78 (14 1400 3575)
10 8.45 (1256 2175)
TABLE I: BPSK → QPSK/8-PSK TCM codes.
BPSK → 16-QAM BPSK → 64-QAM
v β G v β G
3 3.42 (10 5 4 17) 5 3.94 (2 4 47 40 10 63)
4 4.15 (2 27 10 33) 6 4.63 (100 104 55 40 10 117)
5 5.05 (4 55 10 67) 7 4.91 (210 44 371 60 4 227)
6 5.31 (2 167 100 31) 8 5.17 (362 100 745 52 12 573)
7 5.8 (40 327 20 212) 9 5.35 (10 60 1277 344 16 1747)
8 6.13 (200 757 14 725) 10 5.61 (6 62 3341 3436 12 2473)
9 6.33 (30 1137 346 1453)
10 6.63 (774 3103 16 2653)
TABLE II: BPSK → 16-QAM/64-QAM TCM codes.
8-PSK → 16-QAM
v β G
1 3.11 (0 1 0 1) (0 1 0 0) (1 0 3 1)
2 4.36 (0 0 0 1) (1 3 0 1) (3 2 3 3)
3 5.33 (0 1 0 1) (1 3 1 0) (7 1 5 3)
4 6.12 (0 1 0 1) (3 2 1 4) (4 6 6 5)
5 6.12 (0 1 0 2) (3 7 3 0) (2 2 4 5)
6 6.79 (0 1 0 1) (13 13 17 16) (7 6 3 16)
7 7.37 (0 1 0 1) (10 15 16 2) (17 11 17 23)
8 7.37 (0 2 0 1) (3 17 5 15) (16 15 20 21)
9 7.37 (0 1 0 1) (1 5 1 2) (332 10 336 77)
10 7.37 (15 0 10 16) (15 10 16 13) (5 33 35 15)
8-PSK → 64-QAM
v β G
3 4.15 (0 0 0 0 0 1) (0 2 1 3 3 2) (2 3 5 7 1 5)
4 4.66 (0 0 1 0 0 1) (0 1 1 0 0 2) (4 15 0 1 14 0)
5 5.12 (0 0 1 0 0 1) (0 0 1 0 1 3) (4 35 24 13 21 37)
6 5.53 (0 0 1 0 0 1) (0 2 1 0 2 2) (12 53 70 36 75 71)
7 5.73 (0 2 3 0 2 2) (0 2 1 0 2 3) (12 27 10 4 47 6)
8 5.91 (1 0 1 0 0 1) (2 0 0 0 0 3) (172 254 270 6 157 124)
9 6.26 (0 0 1 0 0 1) (0 2 1 0 3 5) (1 272 303 300 21 26)
10 6.42 (0 0 1 0 0 1) (0 2 1 0 6 6) (12 653 670 236 475 471)
TABLE III: 8-PSK → 16-QAM/64-QAM TCM codes.
16-QAM → 64-QAM
v β G
2 3.31 (0 0 0 0 0 1) (0 0 1 0 0 1) (2 3 1 1 3 1) (0 3 2 1 0 0)
3 3.31 (0 0 1 0 0 0) (2 3 2 1 0 2) (2 0 1 0 3 0) (2 3 1 1 2 1)
4 4.18 (0 0 1 0 0 0) (0 0 1 0 0 1) (0 3 0 0 2 1) (1 10 11 6 5 0)
5 4.56 (0 0 1 0 0 1) (0 0 1 0 0 0) (0 3 2 1 2 1) (14 24 17 4 3 10)
6 4.91 (0 0 0 0 0 1) (0 0 1 0 0 0) (0 3 1 1 2 0) (32 14 12 30 57 63)
7 5.23 (0 0 1 0 0 1) (0 0 1 0 0 0) (14 17 12 5 16 11) (14 24 17 4 3 10)
8 5.53 (0 0 0 0 0 1) (0 0 1 0 0 1) (26 27 5 15 37 31) (0 23 26 15 0 24)
9 5.81 (0 0 0 0 0 1) (0 0 1 0 0 1) (1 12 2 4 7 10) (55 25 123 42 177 73)
10 5.81 (0 0 0 0 0 1) (0 0 1 0 0 1) (1 6 6 2 7 4) (317 151 641 302 737 36)
TABLE IV: 16-QAM → 64-QAM TCM codes.
QPSK → 8-PSK QPSK → 16-QAM QPSK → 64-QAM
v β G v β G v β G
1 1.12 (0 0 1) (1 2 3) 2 2.55 (1 2 2 1) (1 1 0 3) 4 3.01 (6 6 1 6 4 12) (1 0 3 2 0 1)
2 3.01 (0 0 1) (2 5 1) 3 3.42 (0 3 0 1) (6 0 2 5) 5 3.41 (10 2 15 4 4 12) (4 0 1 2 0 5)
3 3.6 (0 1 2) (2 4 1) 4 3.8 (0 5 0 2) (7 2 2 7) 6 3.68 (40 2 72 76 30 75) (0 0 3 2 0 1)
4 4.13 (0 1 3) (6 10 13) 5 4.15 (2 10 14 37) (0 3 2 1) 7 3.94 (6 26 71 20 44 66) (0 1 3 0 0 5)
5 4.59 (4 17 13) (0 4 1) 6 4.47 (1 12 16 11) (1 13 16 7) 8 4.1 (0 4 3 6 7 15) (34 32 46 34 54 61)
6 5.01 (0 4 3) (12 1 20) 7 5.05 (12 25 5 2) (0 4 0 17) 9 4.26 (24 16 110 6 62 73) (4 0 7 4 2 12)
7 5.01 (10 75 30) (0 2 7) 8 5.05 (15 3 12 25) (12 35 24 10) 10 4.63 (12 2 7 4 0 17) (330 102 231 140 46 220)
8 5.75 (42 165 134) (0 6 1) 9 5.56 (47 57 36 65) (1 22 2 13)
9 5.75 (0 1 6) (122 250 311) 10 5.56 (5 31 30 23) (70 27 10 116)
10 6.02 (0 6 7) (376 227 763)
TABLE V: QPSK → 8-PSK/16-QAM/64-QAM TCM codes.
K N Tfull(s) Trandom(s)
BPSK QPSK 1 ≈ 0
BPSK 8-PSK 4 ≈ 0
BPSK 16-QAM 263 15
QPSK 8-PSK 57 44
QPSK 16-QAM 7101 54
TABLE VI: Running time comparison between full search and
random search for codes of constraint length v = 5.
category, we perform a full search for some “small” tuples1
(K,N , v) and compare the results with codes found by random
search. As we conjectured, the full search does not find any
code better than the random search in those cases. Yet, the
random search is extremely fast (cf. Table VI). The search
results show that good codes are distributed randomly in
the search space, thus searching with randomization is very
efficient, and especially useful for large constraint length and
high-order modulations.
Asymptotic coding gain The search results show that with
a large enough constraint length there are codes such that in
addition to modulation hiding, the resiliency of the system
can be boosted up to 8.5dB over uncoded systems, resulting
an improvement of up to 10dB compared to recent work [27].
V. CRYPTOGRAPHIC INTERLEAVING
Although good TCM codes can improve the system robust-
ness and hide the modulation, the output symbols produced
by the codes are not indistinguishable to the adversary. In
this section, we propose “Cryptographic Interleaving” as a
solution for the code concealing problem. As suggested by the
name, we use cryptographic functions for the concealing goal.
Different from conventional data encryption, cryptographic
operations are performed on the baseband symbols (otherwise
it is vulnerable to constellation-based modulation-guessing
attacks discussed in Section III). We devise an efficient method
for generating fast cryptographic interleaving functions.
Interleaving process The interleaving process is performed on
coded symbols produced by the GTCM module before radio
transmission. The interleaved symbols must be indistinguish-
able to the adversary. Specifically, the following requirements
should be met: (1) interleaved symbols look like a sequence
produced by a random code, (2) symbols belonging to different
packets are differently permuted, and (3) the user identity is
not revealed. For compactness, we assume the existence of a
1 Larger values of K,N or v make full search run forever in our tests.
shared secret key associated to the undergoing communication
session between the transmitter and receiver. The symbol
interleaving map is randomly selected based on the session’s
secret key and the transmitted packet number.
For convenience, we assume that the coded symbols pro-
duced by the GTCM module are divided into multiple blocks,
each has m symbols, and a fixed number of blocks are packed
into a transmitted frame. To randomly interleave the symbols,
the basic idea is to pre-build a set of interleaving tables and
select one to use based on the tuple information (user key
K, packet number s, block i). The mapping from the tuple
(K, s, i) to the interleaving table index can be created by a
hash function (e.g., SHA2). For example, let {I0, . . . , IN−1}
be the set of N predefined interleaving tables, and h denote
the hash function. The interleaving table Ij is selected by
j = h(|K|s|i|) mod N and used to interleave the block i of
packet s. As a result, the block i’s coded symbols y0, . . . ,
ym−1 are permuted into yIj(0), . . . , yIj(m−1) for transmission.
Although the precomputed tables approach is conceptually
simple, it is hard to implement in practice as one needs to
precompute a large number of interleaving functions so that
the adversary cannot guess. This, however, requires significant
computation and storage resources. In the following, we pro-
pose a practical and efficient solution based on a cryptographic
linear construction of permutation/interleaving functions.
Cryptographic linear interleaving To eliminate the cost of
precomputing interleaving tables, we assume the number of
symbols per block, m, is a prime, and define the interleaving
functions as linear functions: IA,B(x) = Ax + B mod m,
where A ∈ {1 . .m − 1}, B ∈ {0 . .m − 1}. It is clear from
the construction above that any pair (A,B) will produce a
bijective function IA,B(x) with respect to x, i.e., IA,B(x) is
an interleaving function. To randomly generate A,B such that
the requirements for indistinguishability are met, we apply a
hash function h on the tuple information (K, s, i) and compute
A = (h(|K|s|i|0) mod (m−1))+1, B = h(|K|s|i|1) mod m.
The coded symbols y0, . . . , ym−1 of block i are now permuted
into yIA,B(0), . . . , yIA,B(m−1) for transmission.
Frame format Since the interleaving processing on the coded
symbols of the user data involves using not only the secret
key K, but also the packet number s and block index i, the
transmitter needs to embed those information along with the
rate information into the transmitted frame. In the following,
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Fig. 7: Uncoded BPSK vs. coded higher-order modulations (v=10).
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Fig. 8: Uncoded QPSK vs. coded higher-order modulations (v=10).
we describe the structure of the physical layer’s frame and
also discuss the encoding procedure for the frame header.
P MCS SEQ ... R
symbol block 1 symbol block 2
........
crypto.interleave
encrypted + robust
modulation
In the transmitted frame, the preamble P is a publicly known
bit sequence (typically 64 bits) used for frame synchronization
at the receiver. The MCS (modulation and coding scheme)
field stores the TCM code’s identifier used to encode the data.
The SEQ field specifies the packet number required for the
interleaving process. The R field stores a random number
generated per packet by the transmitter. The frame header is
encrypted by EK(MCS |SEQ | . . . |R) using AES encryption
E with the shared secret key K. The header is encoded by
a public robust coding scheme and along with the preamble
is modulated by a public robust modulation. Note that since
header and preamble are short, TCM codes are not beneficial
as Viterbi decoder is only applied for long sequences.
Security and robustness Since the interleaving functions are
generated based on the cryptographic hash function with a
secret key K applied on varying packet number s and block
i, the coefficients A and B are indistinguishable under chosen
plaintext attacks (semantically secure), thus the interleaved
symbol sequences are also indistinguishable. As the hash
function is lightweight, the computation of IA,B is extremely
fast. The header is also semantically secure due to the use
of random R with AES encryption. It is also robust as lost
synchronization does not propagate to next frames.
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Fig. 9: Uncoded 8-PSK vs. coded higher-order modulations (v=10).
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Fig. 10: Uncoded 16-QAM vs. coded 64-QAM (v=10).
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we report on the evaluation of the codes
found in Section IV, in comparison with their corresponding
uncoded modulations. The evaluation is performed through
simulations in MatLab. For each pair of the original uncoded
modulation K and the target coded modulation N , a transmis-
sion of 1Gbits is carried in an additive white Gaussian noise
channel. We start the simulation at the normalized signal-
to-noise ratio Eb/N0 = 0 and increase it by 0.5dB after
every run. The bit error rates corresponding to each SNR
level are recorded. The simulation stops when all data is done
transmitted or 1000 bit errors are reached.
Due to lack of space, we only show the evaluation results
for the codes of constraint length v = 10. At BER = 10−6, in
addition to hiding the rate, the coding gain (boosting) provided
by the coded modulations ranges from about 5dB to more than
6.5dB when 64-QAM modulation is used for rate concealing.
Compared to the modulation unification technique proposed in
recent related work [27] whose performance degrades by about
1.2dB for hiding BPSK modulation in 64-QAM modulation,
we gain up to 8dB. If the system only supports QPSK as
the highest-order modulation, an upgrading BPSK → QPSK
can give an advantage of 7.5dB over uncoded BPSK, while
the modulation unification loses about 2dB, resulting in our
improvement of up to 9.5dB. In scenarios where the adversary
is weak (i.e., high SNR), the coding gain is close to the
asymptotic gain about 8.5dB presented in Section IV, resulting
in an improvement of up to 10dB.
The evaluation results also show that the performance boost
is similar across different target modulations. For example
in Fig. 8, using 8-PSK as the target modulation is within 1dB
of using target modulation 16-QAM or 64-QAM. This leads
to a key lesson that the rate concealing technique based on
coded modulations can be flexibly used in various systems,
where different modulations are supported. One can imagine
that in future wireless communication systems always use the
highest modulation possible for the RF Front End ADC and
AGC, and adapt to the channel conditions only by changing
the code.
VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We proposed a solution to the problem of hiding the rate of a
communication while simultaneously increasing the robustness
of the communication to interference. Our approach relies on
algorithms for discovering new General TCM codes, and a
cryptographic interleaving scheme. These algorithms include
new efficient techniques to determine the free distance of
non-uniform TCM codes. We explicitly derived 85 codes for
upgrading any modulation in {BPSK, QPSK, 8-PSK, 16-
QAM, 64-QAM} into any higher order modulation. These are
the best codes among uniform and non-uniform TCM codes
specifically designed for coded modulation and that conceal
the underlying rate of the communication. We demonstrate
that beyond achieving rate-hiding, these codes also provide
an order of magnitude improvement of energy efficiency in
comparison with recent related work. The proposed codes and
cryptographic interleaving techniques are easily deployable in
software defined radios since they only necessitate a small
table per code. Beyond defending against rate adaptation
attacks and boosting the performance of wireless systems at a
time where RF spectrum is scarce, they also mitigate against
passive attacks against users traffic analysis [28].
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